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Abstract—This paper considers secure energy-efficient
routing in the presence of multiple passive eavesdroppers.
Previous work in this area has considered secure routing
assuming probabilistic or exact knowledge of the location
and channel-state-information (CSI) of each eavesdropper.
In wireless networks, however, the locations and CSIs of
passive eavesdroppers are not known, making it challeng-
ing to guarantee secrecy for any routing algorithm.
We develop an efficient (in terms of energy consumption
and computational complexity) routing algorithm that does
not rely on any information about the locations and CSIs of
the eavesdroppers. Our algorithm guarantees secrecy even
in disadvantaged wireless environments, where multiple
eavesdroppers try to eavesdrop each message, are equipped
with directional antennas, or can get arbitrarily close to
the transmitter. The key is to employ additive random jam-
ming to exploit inherent non-idealities of the eavesdrop-
per’s receiver, which makes the eavesdroppers incapable of
recording the messages. We have simulated our proposed
algorithm and compared it with existing secrecy routing
algorithms in both single-hop and multi-hop networks.
Our results indicate that when the uncertainty in the
locations of eavesdroppers is high and/or in disadvantaged
wireless environments, our algorithm outperforms existing
algorithms in terms of energy consumption and secrecy.
Index Terms—Network security, Wireless networks,
Quantization, Routing protocols, Energy-aware systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information secrecy has traditionally been achieved
by cryptography, which is based on assumptions on
current and future computational capabilities of the ad-
versary. However, there are numerous examples of cryp-
tographic schemes being broken that were supposedly
secure [1]. This motivates the consideration of physical
layer schemes which are based on information-theoretic
secrecy [2]. In a scenario where an adversary tries to
eavesdrop on the main channel between a transmitter
and a receiver, Wyner showed that, if the eavesdropper’s
channel is degraded with respect to the main channel,
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a positive secrecy rate can be achieved. This idea was
later extended to Gaussian channels [3], and to the more
general case of a wiretap channel with a "more noisy"
or "less capable" eavesdropper channel [4]. Thus, the
key to obtain information-theoretic secrecy is having an
advantage for the main channel against the eavesdropper
channel. However, such an advantage cannot always be
guaranteed. In particular, the locations of eavesdroppers
are not known and an eavesdropper might be much closer
to the transmitter than the intended receiver. To overcome
this problem, one must design algorithms to obtain the
required advantage for the intended recipient over the
eavesdroppers.
The idea of adding artificial noise to the signal by
means of multiple antennas at the transmitter or some
helper nodes was introduced in [5]. The artificial noise
is placed in the null space of the channel from the
transmitter to the intended recipient and thus does not
affect it. But, it degrades the eavesdropper’s channel with
high probability. Subsequently, cooperative jamming for
physical layer secrecy has been extensively studied, e.g.
[6]–[11]. These works mainly focus on one-hop networks
consisting of one transmitter, one receiver, one eaves-
dropper and maybe a few helper nodes that generate the
artificial noise. The case of two-hop networks consisting
of one transmitter, one receiver, one relay, one eaves-
dropper and a few noise generating helper nodes has also
been considered extensively in the literature [12]–[15]. In
the case of multi-hop networks with multiple transmitters
and receivers and in the presence of many eavesdroppers,
often the asymptotic results for large networks have been
investigated [16]–[20].
However, whereas one-hop, two-hop and asymptoti-
cally large networks are most amenable to analysis and
do provide insight into wireless network operation, most
ad hoc networks in practice operate with a number of
nodes and a number of hops that is between these two
extremes. Hence, the design of algorithms to provide
secrecy in networks of arbitrary "moderate" size is of
interest, which is considered here. We consider a network
with multiple system nodes where a source node com-
municates with a destination node in a multi-hop fashion
2and in the presence of multiple passive eavesdroppers.
We define the cost of communication to be the total
energy spent by the system nodes to securely and reliably
transmit a message from the source to the destination.
Thus, our goal is to find routes that minimize the
cost of transmission between the source and destination
nodes. Energy efficiency is an important consideration
in designing the routing algorithms, and energy efficient
routing has been extensively studied in the literature, e.g.
[21]–[31]. However, only a few works have considered
energy-aware routing with secrecy considerations [32],
[33].
In [32], [33], the authors use a general probabilistic
model for the location of each eavesdropper, and intro-
duce a routing algorithm called SMER (secure minimum
energy routing) which employs cooperative jamming to
provide secrecy at each hop such that the end-to-end
secrecy of the multi-hop source-destination path is guar-
anteed. When the density of eavesdroppers is low such
that there is only one eavesdropper per hop, the location
of the eavesdroppers are known, and the eavesdroppers
are restricted to use omni-directional antennas, this ap-
proach is promising. However, since we are considering
passive eavesdroppers, their location and channel-state-
information (CSI) are not known to the legitimate nodes.
Further, in a disadvantaged wireless environment, many
passive eavesdroppers might try to intercept the message
at each hop, with large uncertainty in the locations
of the eavesdroppers, and the eavesdroppers might get
arbitrarily close to the transmitters. In such a situation,
the energy consumption of any cooperative jamming
approach including the scheme of [32], [33] can become
very high. Further, if we plan for the wrong number of
eavesdroppers or do not correctly anticipate the quality
of the eavesdroppers’ channels, the secrecy will be
compromised. Hence, in this paper we seek methods that
do not rely on the quality of eavesdroppers’ channels and
their locations and can provide secrecy in disadvantaged
environments at a reasonable cost.
Recently, in [34]–[38], authors have introduced the
idea of employing an ephemeral key to exploit imper-
fections of the eavesdropper’s A/D to obtain everlasting
secrecy. In contrast to other methods based on a key
to facilitate secrecy in wireless networks, the works in
[34]–[38] do not presume that the key is kept secret
from the eavesdropper indefinitely; rather, a distortion
is used to build an advantage for the intended receiver
over the eavesdropper by inhibiting the eavesdropper’s
ability to even record a reasonable version of the message
for later decoding. In particular, [38] introduced the
idea of adding a random jamming signal with large
variations based on the ephemeral key to obtain secrecy
in disadvantaged wireless environments. The work of
[38] considered a basic point-to-point communication
setting in the presence of one eavesdropper, and thus
did not consider the probabilistic behavior of a real
communication channel or the impact of imperfections
in the channel estimation and jamming cancellation at
the intended receiver. In this paper, we address the
application of [38] in a multi-hop network in the pres-
ence of multiple eavesdroppers with unknown locations
and CSIs. Also, we consider a more realistic wireless
setting than [38], and design an efficient (polynomial
time) routing algorithm such that the aggregate energy
spent to convey the message and to generate the random
jamming signal is minimized. Hence, a summary of the
contributions of this paper is:
• In the modeling of the point-to-point links in our
network, we consider a more realistic wireless
communication environment compared to the line-
of-sight communication considered in the point-to-
point method described in [38] by: (a) incorporating
multi-path fading in our modeling and analysis; (b)
in contrast to secrecy approaches that consider per-
fect jamming cancellation at the legitimate receiver
(e.g. [5], [38]), considering the channel estimation
error which causes an error in the cancellation of
the jamming signal at the intended receiver.
• We develop an optimization framework to minimize
the amount of energy that is used by the random
jamming technique to convey a message reliably
and securely from a source node to a destination
node in a multi-hop fashion. Based on this opti-
mization framework, we provide an efficient routing
algorithm that can be used to establish a secure
minimum energy path between any pair of nodes in
a wireless network with arbitrary node placement.
• We show that secure and reliable multi-hop commu-
nication is possible in an arbitrary network, even in
the presence of multiple eavesdroppers of unknown
number, locations and CSIs. Notably, we show that
the near eavesdropper challenge, which is a critical
challenge in providing physical layer secrecy in
wireless networks (e.g. see [32]), especially in the
case of passive eavesdroppers with unknown loca-
tions and CSIs, can be resolved using the random
jamming technique.
• We show that the algorithm developed from the ran-
dom jamming approach coupled with our approach
to network optimization: (a) has improved perfor-
mance in different scenarios compared to other
approaches (i.e. SMER [32]); (b) has performance
that is independent of the particular statistical distri-
3bution of the channel gain between the transmitter
and the eavesdropper, and thus will work for any
kind of eavesdropper’s channel.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II describes the system model, the approach which is
used in this paper, and the metric. The analysis of the
problem and the algorithm for minimum energy routing
with secrecy constraints is presented in Section III. In
Section IV, the results of numerical examples for var-
ious realizations of one-hop and multi-hop systems are
provided, and the comparison of the proposed method to
SMER algorithm is presented. Conclusions are discussed
in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND APPROACH
A. System Model
We consider a wireless network with nodes that are
distributed arbitrarily. A source node generates the mes-
sage and conveys it to a destination node in a multi-
hop fashion. An H-hop path from the source to the
destination is denoted by Π = 〈ℓ1, . . . , ℓH〉, where ℓi is
the link that connects two nodes Si andDi along the path
Π. There are also non-colluding eavesdroppers present in
the network such that the message transmission of each
link is prone to be overheard by multiple eavesdroppers.
We denote the set of eavesdroppers by E . The eavesdrop-
pers are assumed to be passive, and thus their locations
and their channel-state informations are not known to
the legitimate nodes. We assume that the system nodes
are equipped with omni-directional antennas while the
eavesdroppers can be equipped with more sophisticated
directional antennas.
For the channel, we consider transmission in a quasi-
static Rayleigh fading environment. Let hS,D be the
fading coefficient between node S and node D (This
assumption is relaxed for eavesdroppers’ channels, as
discussed later.). Without loss of generality, we assume
E[|hS,D|2] = 1. Suppose the transmitter S transmits the
signal xS at power level PS . The signal that the receiver
D (analogously, eavesdropper E) receives is:
y˜D =
xShS,D
d
α
2
S,D
+ nD
where dS,D is the distance between S and D, α is the
path-loss exponent, and nD ∼ N
(
0, σ2D
)
is additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at the receiver D.
Because compression of a receiver’s front-end dy-
namic range is the biggest challenge when operating
in the presence of strong jamming, we also consider
the effect of the analog-to-digital converter (A/D) on
the received signal, which consists of the quantization
noise and the quantizer’s overflow. The quantization
noise is a result of the limited resolution of the A/D,
and the quantizer’s overflow happens when the range
of the received signal is larger than the span of the
A/D. We assume that the quantization noise is uniformly
distributed [39, Section 5]. The resolution of a b-bit A/D
with full dynamic range [−r, r] is
δ =
2r
2b
.
Suppose the receiver has a bD-bit A/D and the eavesdrop-
per has a bE-bit A/D. Since the power of the received
signal at the receiver D is PS |hS,D|
2
dαS,D
, we set the range of
the A/D as,
rD = l
√
PS |hS,D|
d
α/2
S,D
,
where l is a constant that maximizes the mutual infor-
mation between the transmitted signal and the received
signal [35]. The resolution of the A/D of the receiver D
is:
δD =
2l
√
PS |hS,D|
2bDd
α/2
S,D
.
Analogously, the range of the eavesdropper’s A/D is,
rE = l
√
PS |hS,E|
d
α/2
S,E
,
and hence, the resolution of the A/D of the eavesdropper
E is:
δE =
2l
√
PS |hS,E |
2bEd
α/2
S,E
.
B. Approach: Random Jamming for Secrecy
Our goal is to obtain end-to-end everlasting secrecy,
which means that even if each eavesdropper works
forever on the signal that is recorded, it will not be able
to extract the message. Unlike cryptography, we do not
assume any limitation on the computational capability of
the eavesdropper. Instead, we exploit current hardware
limitations of the eavesdropper to achieve everlasting
security, as explained in detail in [35], [38]. At each
hop, we use the random jamming scheme of [37], [38]
to provide everlasting secrecy. In this scheme, based on a
cryptographic key that is shared between the legitimate
nodes, a jamming signal with large variation is added
to the transmitted signal. It is assumed that the crypto-
graphic key should be kept secret just for the time of
transmission, and can be revealed to the eavesdropper
right after transmission without compromising secrecy.
The legitimate receiver can use its key to cancel the
effect of the jamming before analog-to-digital-conversion
4(A/D), while the eavesdropper must record the signal and
jamming, and cancel the effect of jamming later from
the recorded signal (after analog-to-digital-conversion).
Hence, the signal that the legitimate receiver receives is
well-matched to its A/D converter. On the other hand,
the large variation of the random jamming signal causes
overflow of the eavesdropper’s A/D. The eavesdropper
may enlarge the span of her A/D to prevent overflows;
however, it degrades the resolution of its A/D, thus
increasing the A/D noise.
Note that unlike cryptography, the secret key used in
the random jamming approach only needs to be kept
secret for the duration of the wireless transmission (i.e.
it can be given to Eve immediately afterward). The
eavesdropper must store the signal and try to cancel the
jamming signal from the recorded signal at the output
of her A/D after she obtains the key. However, the
jamming signal is designed such that Eve has already
lost the information she would need to recover the secret
message, even if she obtains the key immediately after
the transmission. In order to gain more insight into
the difference between this approach and cryptography,
suppose that the legitimate receivers have access to a
standard key exchange protocol that is currently compu-
tationally secure in the near-term beyond any reasonable
doubt (e.g. 1028-bit Elliptic Curve Diffie- Hellman).
If we employ the proposed scheme or cryptography
to convey a secret message, we encounter two risks,
respectively:
1) Risk 1: In practice, the time it takes to transmit
a message over the wireless channel is very short
and in the order of a few milliseconds, e.g., 10
milliseconds. An eavesdropper records the key
establishment messages and breaks that key in the
next 10 milliseconds (the time during which we
are using that key to transmit the message we
desire to keep secret forever with our technique).
Obviously, there would not be much technological
advance in those 10 milliseconds, so he/she is
essentially limited to 10 milliseconds of effort with
the technology in place at the time of message
transmission.
2) Risk 2: An eavesdropper records the key estab-
lishment messages and ciphertext of a standard
cryptographic approach, and then uses an unlim-
ited amount of time (say, 20 years as a lower
bound to unlimited) to break that key and decode
the secret message. Obviously, the eavesdropper
then not only has a much longer time, but also
can take advantage of what are certain to be
significant technological advances in algorithms,
computation, and methods of "hacking" the key
from one of the parties.
Clearly, Risk 1 and Risk 2 are very different risk classes,
and one would feel much more comfortable with Risk 1
(which is presented by our scheme) than Risk 2 (which
is the risk of standard cryptographic approaches) when
attempting to achieve everlasting security.
In [37], [38] it is shown that, although increasing
the span of the A/D causes the eavesdropper to suffer
from more quantization noise, the overflows are more
harmful, and thus the best strategy that the eavesdropper
can employ is to enlarge the span of its A/D such that it
captures all of the signal and thus no overflow occurs.
The random jamming signal J that the transmitter
adds to its signal follows a uniform distribution with
2K jamming levels. Hence, K bits of the cryptographic
key to generate each jamming symbol are needed. The
distance between two consecutive jamming levels is
2l
√
PS . Thus, the average energy that is spent on the
random jamming signal is,
PJ = E[J
2]
=
1
2K
2K−1∑
j=0
(
2l
√
PSj
)2
=
4l2PS
2K
2K−1∑
j=0
j2
=
4l2PS
2K
× 2
3K+1 − 3× 22K + 2K
6
=
2l2
(
22K+1 − 3× 2K + 1)
3
PS
= βPS (1)
where β is a constant that depends on K.
Suppose that the eavesdropper uses a bE-bit A/D.
Since the power of the signal at the eavesdropper’s
receiver is
PS |hS,E|2
dαS,E
, and considering the automatic-gain-
control of the eavesdropper’s receiver, the resolution of
the eavesdropper’s A/D before jamming is:
δE =
2l
√
PS |hS,E|2
2bEd
α/2
S,E
(2)
Now suppose that the transmitter adds the jamming to
its signal. Since the eavesdropper does not know the key,
it should enlarge the span of its A/D to capture all the
signal plus jamming. The maximum amplitude of the
signal plus jamming can be written as,√
PS |hS,E |2
d
α/2
S,E
+(2K−1)
√
PS |hS,E |2
d
α/2
S,E
= 2K
√
PS |hS,E|2
d
α/2
S,E
5Thus, the resolution of eavesdropper’s A/D is:
δ′E =
2l
√
PS |hS,E |2
2bEd
α/2
S,E
× 2K = 2l
√
PS |hS,E |2
2bE−Kd
α/2
S,E
(3)
The random jamming scheme of [37], [38] relies on
the limited resolution of the eavesdropper’s A/D. As
opposed to cryptography, technology improvement in
the future are not of concern here because the signal
cannot be captured. Hence, we should assume that the
legitimate nodes either know a bound on the quality of
the eavesdroppers’ A/Ds, or plan for the case that all
eavesdroppers use the best A/D technology available at
the time. The realization of this assumption is facilitated
by the fact that A/D technology progresses very slowly1.
Hence, throughout this paper we assume that the resolu-
tion of the A/D of each eavesdropper is equal to or less
than bE bits.
C. Jamming Cancellation at the Legitimate Receiver
Nearly all techniques that exploit jamming for secrecy
ignore the effects of channel estimation error (e.g. [5]–
[11], [32], [37], [38]), yet it is important since in real
systems the jamming power is high, and thus the residual
jamming due to imperfections in channel estimation
can be considerable. Note that from [40], [41], the
channel estimation error might be very small, but, since
we have high-power jammers, the residual interference
is still important and can have an impact on system
performance. Hence, we consider the residual jamming
at the receiver due to errors in the channel estimates.
Given a pilot-based approach for channel estimation,
the channel estimate is conditionally Gaussian, where
the mean of this Gaussian distribution is the minimum
mean-squared estimate (MMSE) channel estimate. The
estimation error of this MMSE is a zero-mean Gaussian
random variable with variance θ2 which is a constant
(e.g. see [42]). The resultant noise is a multiplication of
two independent Gaussian random variables; the residual
channel estimation error and the received jamming sig-
nal. Hence, the channel estimation noise is a zero-mean
non-Gaussian random variable with variance,
σ2J = θ
2PJ |hS,D|2
dαS,D
. (4)
D. Metric
Since the quantization noise is uniformly distributed
[39, Section 5] and the channel estimation noise is non-
Gaussian, the derivation of the capacity of the channel
1For a complete discussion on this see [38, Section V].
between transmitter and receiver, and the channel be-
tween transmitter and eavesdropper, is not straightfor-
ward. Thus, we apply an upper-bound and a lower-bound
of the capacity of a channel with independent additive
noise as described in [43] and [44]. Suppose that the
resolution of the A/D of receiver D is δD. The capacity
of the channel between the transmitter S and the receiver
D conditioned on the fading coefficient can be lower
bounded as [38]:
CS,D
(|hS,D|2)≥log

PS |hS,D|
2
dαS,D
+ σ2J + σ
2
D +
δ2D
12
σ2J + σ
2
D +
δ2D
12

,
=log

PS |hS,D|
2
dαS,D
+
θ2PJ |hS,D|
2
dαS,D
+ σ2D +
δ2D
12
θ2PJ |hS,D|2
dαS,D
+ σ2D +
δ2D
12

, (5)
and the capacity of the channel between the transmitter
S and the eavesdropper E can be upper bounded as [38]:
CS,E
(|hS,E |2) ≤ log

 PS|hS,E |
2
dαS,E
+ σ2E +
δ
′2
E
12
σ2E +
δ
′2
E
2πe

 . (6)
In order to guarantee proper signal reception at the
legitimate receiver, the capacity of the main channel
should be greater than a predetermined threshold γ∗D.
Let us define,
γD =
PS |hS,D|2
dαS,D
+ θ
2PJ |hS,D|2
dαS,D
+ σ2D +
δ2D
12
θ2PJ |hS,D|2
dαS,D
+ σ2D +
δ2D
12
. (7)
Hence, the communication between source and destina-
tion is reliable if,
γD ≥ γ∗D. (8)
We define the average outage probability between S and
D as,
pout = P (γD < γ
∗
D) . (9)
In order to guarantee secrecy, the capacity of the channel
between the transmitter and eavesdropper should be less
than a predetermined threshold γ∗E . We define,
γE =
PS|hS,E|2
dαS,E
+ σ2E +
δ
′2
E
12
σ2E +
δ
′2
E
2πe
. (10)
Hence, the communication between source and destina-
tion is secure if,
γE < γ
∗
E . (11)
We define the average secrecy-outage probability (i.e.
eavesdropping probability) as,
peav = P (γE ≥ γ∗E) . (12)
6From (8) and (11) we conclude that if reliability and
secrecy constraints are satisfied, the secrecy rate of at
least,
Rs = log(γ
∗
D)− log(γ∗E), (13)
can be achieved. However as described above, instead of
considering a constraint on the secrecy rate, we consider
constraints on the individual success probabilities of the
receiver and the eavesdropper. If we instead put the
constraint on the secrecy rate, for a single secrecy rate
many (γD, γE) would satisfy the constraint. But codes
are designed to work on a specific (γD, γE) [45]; hence,
we consider (8) and (11) as our reliability and secrecy
constraints, respectively.
III. SERJ: SECURE ENERGY-EFFICIENT ROUTING
USING JAMMING
Consider multi-hop communication between two ar-
bitrary nodes, source S and destination D. Suppose
ΠSD denotes the set of all possible paths between
source S and destination D, and Λ(.) is the cost of
communication. Our goal is to find the optimum path
Π∗ from the set ΠSD such that,
Π∗ = arg min
Π∈ΠSD
Λ (Π) ,
Please note that for a path Π, Λ(Π) is the total cost of
secret communication, which consists of the power to
transmit the message PSi and the jamming power PJi of
each transmitter along the path Π, i.e. our optimization
objective is,
Λ (Π) = min
∑
ℓi∈Π
(PSi + PJi). (14)
where the optimization is over all paths in ΠSD and
all PSis and PJis of the transmitters along the optimum
path. By applying the coding technique described in
[46], securing each hop is sufficient to ensure end-to-
end secrecy. Hence, we consider the following secrecy
constraints,
γEi,j < γ
∗
E, ∀ℓi ∈ Π and ∀Ej ∈ E , (15)
which means that for all eavesdroppers Ej ∈ E in
the network, and for all links ℓi along the path Π, the
secrecy constraint must be satisfied. In other words, the
communication of each link ℓi ∈ Π must be secure from
every and all eavesdroppers in the network.
Transmission is reliable provided that the following
end-to-end average outage probability constraint is guar-
anteed,
pSDOUT = 1−
∏
ℓi∈Π
(
1− piout
) ≤ ǫ. (16)
where piout denotes the average outage probability of the
link ℓi = 〈Si,Di〉. Also, the following constraints should
be satisfied,
PSi ≥ 0, and PJi ≥ 0. (17)
A. Analysis of Secrecy
Consider the secrecy constraint (15). Substituting δ′E
from (3) into (11), γEi,j can be written as,
γEi,j =
PSi |hSi,Ej |
2
dαSi,Ej
(
1 + 4l
2
12×22bE−2Ki
)
+ σ2E
PSi4l
2|hSi,Ej |
2
2πedαSi,Ej 2
2bE−2Ki
+ σ2E
, (18)
where without loss of generality, we assume that all
eavesdroppers use bE-bit A/Ds (or bE is the highest
resolution that the A/D of an eavesdropper can have).
Since we do not want to make assumptions on the eaves-
droppers’s noise characteristics, we assume σ2E = 0.
Note that the assumption of σ2E = 0 is in favor of the
eavesdropper, i.e. the secrecy capacity of the wiretap
channel with any σ2E > 0 is more than the secrecy
capacity of the same wiretap channel with σ2E = 0.
Consequently, if our algorithm is able to provide secrecy
when σ2E = 0, it can also provide secrecy when σ
2
E > 0.
Substituting σ2E = 0 in (18), the worst case γEi,j can be
written as,
γEi,j =
PSi |hSi,Ej |
2
dαSi,E
(
1 + 4l
2
12×22bE−2Ki
)
PSi4l
2|hSi,Ej |
2
2πedαSi,Ej 2
2bE−2Ki
=
1 + 4l
2
12×22bE−2Ki
4l2
2πe22bE−2Ki
< γ∗E . (19)
In (19) γEi,j does not depend on the eavesdroppers’s
noise σ2E (since we have considered the worst case),
the eavesdroppers’s location and the eavesdroppers’s
channel state information (CSI). Thus, if we ensure
γEi,j < γ
∗
E , the transmission of the relay Si will be
secure from the eavesdropper Ej regardless of noise,
location and CSI of Ej . Further, note that γEi,j in (19)
is a deterministic function, and does not depend on the
probabilistic nature of the channel (it does not depend
on |hSi,Ej |2), and thus if (19) is satisfied, the probability
that an arbitrary eavesdropper in the network intercepts
the message transmitted by Si is zero. This means that
if we choose Ki such that (19) is satisfied, none of the
eavesdroppers in the network Ej ∈ E can intercept the
message that Si is transmitting. Rearranging (19), the
number of key bits per jamming symbol Ki is lower
bounded as,
Ki >
1
2
log2
(
πe22bE−1
l2(γ∗E − πe/6)
)
. (20)
7This bound only depends on the resolution of the eaves-
dropper’s A/D (which is assumed to be bounded by bE ,
as discussed in Section II-B), and does not depend on the
eavesdropper’s location or its CSI. Intuitively, when the
number of key bits per jamming symbol is sufficiently
large, the quantization noise becomes large enough to
protect the message against the eavesdropper regardless
of its location or its CSI. Since the lower bound of
Ki in (20) does not depend on the characteristics of
a specific transmitter Si, we can infer that the same
number of key bits per jamming symbol K can be used
by all transmitters, where the minimum value of K to
guarantee secrecy is,
K =
⌈
1
2
log2
(
πe22bE−1
l2(γ∗E − πe/6)
)⌉
. (21)
Note that γ∗E is a parameter that is determined by the
wiretap code design and hence we can ensure γ∗E > πe/6
by adding enough randomness to the codebook.
Now let us consider the optimization objective in (14)
again. From (1), the jamming power at each node is
proportional to the transmit power, i.e. PJi = βiPSi ,
where,
βi =
2l2
(
22Ki+1 − 3× 2Ki + 1)
3
=
2l2
(
22K+1 − 3× 2K + 1)
3
(22)
Since βi does not depend on a specific transmitter Si,
we can have the same βi for all transmitters and write
β = βi. Hence, the relationship between the jamming
power at each node and the transmit power is PJi =
βPSi , where β is a constant. The secrecy objective in
(14) can be written as,
min
∑
ℓi∈Π
(PSi + PJi)
= min
∑
ℓi∈Π
(1 + β)PSi
= (1 + β)min
∑
ℓi∈Π
PSi . (23)
where the last equality follows because β is independent
of the transmitter, and is already minimized by choosing
the minimum K that satisfies the secrecy constraint
in (21). The optimization in (23) is over all possible
paths between source S and destination D, and over all
transmit powers of the transmitters along the optimum
path. Further, the optimization objective in (23) can be
written as,
min
∑
ℓi∈Π
PSi . (24)
B. Analysis of Reliability
Now consider γD in (7) and the reliability constraint
(16). Without loss of generality, we assume all legiti-
mate receivers have the same quality A/Ds with zero-
mean uniform quantization noise with variance
δ2D
2 , and
experience AWGN with the same variances σ2D. For the
reliability constraint in (16), the probability of outage at
Di is,
piout = P
( PSi |hSi,Di |2
dαSi,Di
+ θ2
PJi |hSi,Di |
2
dαSi,Di
+ σ2D +
δ2D
12
θ2
PJi |hSi,Di |
2
dαSi,Di
+ σ2D +
δ2D
12
<γ∗D
)
= P
( PSi |hSi,Di |2
dαSi,Di
+ θ2
βPSi |hSi,Di |
2
dαSi,Di
+ σ2D +
δ2D
12
θ2
βPSi |hSi,Di |
2
dαSi,Di
+ σ2D +
δ2D
12
<γ∗D
)
= P
(
|hSi,Di |2 <
(γ∗D − 1)
(
σ2D +
δ2D
12
)
PSi(1− (γ∗D − 1)θ2β)/dαSi,Di
)
(25)
= 1− e
−
(γ∗D−1)
(
σ2D+
δ2D
12
)
PSi(1−(γ∗D−1)θ2β)/dαSi,Di , (26)
where (25) holds given that 1− (γ∗D − 1) θ2β > 0. Oth-
erwise it is easy to show that piout = 1. Hence, reliable
communication is possible if θ and β are small enough.
The last equality follows because, for Rayleigh fading,
|hSi,Di |2 is exponentially distributed. Substituting (26)
into (16), the end-to-end outage probability constraint
is,
pSDOUT = 1−
∏
ℓi∈Π
e
−
(γ∗D−1)
(
σ2
D
+
δ2
D
12
)
PSi
(1−(γ∗D−1)θ
2β)/dαSi,Di
= 1− exp
(
−
∑
ℓi∈Π
(γ∗D − 1)
(
σ2D +
δ2D
12
)
PSi
(
1− (γ∗D − 1)θ2β
)
/dαSi,Di
)
≤ ǫ.
Thus, the end-to-end reliability constraint turns into,∑
ℓi∈Π
dαSi,Di
PSi
≤ η, (27)
where,
η =
log
(
1
1−ǫ
) (
1− (γ∗D − 1) θ2β
)
(γ∗D − 1)
(
σ2D +
δ2D
12
) . (28)
C. Optimal Cost of a Given Path
Our goal is to find the optimal path, which requires
the minimum transmission and jamming power to satisfy
both outage and reliability constraints. The optimal path
is not known in advance. Hence, first we find the optimal
transmit and jamming power allocation for a given path
Π, and then we use it to design a routing algorithm that
8finds the optimal path. From (24)-(28), in order to find
the optimal transmit and jamming power allocation for a
given path, we should solve the following optimization
problem,
min
PSi≥0
∑
ℓi∈Π
PSi (29)
subject to: ∑
ℓi∈Π
dαSi,Di
PSi
≤ η (30)
The left side of (30) is a decreasing function of PSi and
our goal is to find the minimum PSi . Hence, we can
substitute the inequality with an equality,∑
ℓi∈Π
dαSi,Di
PSi
= η (31)
This optimization problem can be solved using the
technique of Lagrange multipliers. We must solve (29)
and the following equations simultaneously,
∂
∂PSi
{∑
ℓi∈Π
PSi + λ
(∑
ℓi∈Π
dαSi,Di
PSi
− η
)}
= 0,
for i = 1, . . . ,H.
Taking derivatives we have,
1− λd
α
Si,Di
P 2Si
= 0, i = 1, . . . ,H, (32)
and thus,
PSi =
√
λdαSi,Di (33)
Substituting PSi , i = 1, . . . ,H from (33) into (31), we
obtain that,
λ =
1
η2
(∑
ℓk∈Π
√
dαSi,Di
)2
(34)
Substituting λ from (34) into (33), the optimal transmit
power at each link is given by,
PSi =
1
η
√
dαSi,Di
∑
ℓk∈Π
√
dαSk,Dk (35)
Hence, the aggregate cost of transmitting the message is,
∑
ℓi∈Π
PSi =
1
η
(∑
ℓk∈Π
√
dαSk,Dk
)2
, (36)
and the cost of jamming is,
∑
ℓi∈Π
PJi =
β
η
(∑
ℓk∈Π
√
dαSk,Dk
)2
. (37)
The minimum total (signal+jamming) cost of establish-
ing Π is,
Λ (Π) =
1 + β
η
(∑
ℓk∈Π
√
dαSk,Dk
)2
. (38)
Note that (38) is the minimum cost of establishing an
arbitrary path Π ∈ ΠSD, where ΠSD is the set of all
paths between S and D.
D. Routing Algorithm
Since Λ (Π) in (38) is the minimum cost that can be
assigned to any path Π ∈ ΠSD between S and D, when
we want to find the minimum energy path between S
and D we should use Λ (Π) as our path cost. Hence,
based on the cost Λ (Π), we assign weights W(ℓk) to
each link ℓk in the network so that the weight of a
path W(Π) is given as the sum of its link weights, i.e.
W(Π) =∑ℓi∈ΠW(ℓk), which facilitates constructing a
fast routing algorithm, as follows. These weights should
be chosen such that the path Π∗ that minimizes the
weight of the path W(Π∗) also minimizes the cost of
the path Λ (Π∗) over all paths in ΠSD, i.e. the path
with minimum weight is exactly the path with minimum
cost. Let us define the weight of a link ℓk between
two arbitrary nodes Sk and Dk (ℓk = 〈Sk,Dk〉) in the
network as,
W(ℓk) =
√
dαSk,Dk . (39)
Thus, the weight of a path Π will be,
W(Π) =
∑
ℓk∈Π
√
dαSk,Dk . (40)
Clearly, a path between S and D (in ΠSD) that min-
imizes W(Π) in (40) also minimizes Λ (Π) in (38).
Hence, we should assign the weight W(ℓk) described
in (39) to any link ℓk in the network, and apply any
shortest path algorithm like Dijkestra to find the path
with minimum weight Π∗ between S and D, which
is also the path with minimum cost (the minimum
energy path). From (35), each node along Π∗ forwards
the message to the next node with total (transmit and
jamming) power,
Λ (ℓi) =
1 + β
η
√
dαSi,Di
∑
ℓk∈Π∗
√
dαSk,Dk . (41)
and the total end-to-end cost of communication is,
Λ (Π∗) =
1 + β
η
( ∑
ℓk∈Π∗
√
dαSk,Dk
)2
. (42)
9IV. COMPARISON TO PREVIOUS WORK
In this section we compare the performance of our
algorithm with that of the SMER algorithm [32] in
different scenarios.
SMER Algorithm. In SMER, the system nodes em-
ploy cooperative jamming to establish a secure path,
and, if the eavesdroppers get very close to a transmitter,
the secrecy is compromised. Hence, while the SERJ
algorithm proposed here has no need or sense of a
“guard region”, to employ SMER we must introduce
such into the scenario. Thus, for the sake of comparison
to SMER, assume a guard region with radius rmin > 0
around each transmitter and assume that no eavesdropper
can enter the guard regions. Further, in SMER a set of
locations and the probability that an eavesdropper exists
in each location must be known. In order to address this
requirement of SMER, we divide a circle centered at the
transmitter S and with radius rmax into many sectors.
Each sector is a location where an eavesdropper might
exist. For instance, when three eavesdroppers are present,
three sectors have an eavesdropper with probability one,
and the rest of the sectors have an eavesdropper with
probability zero (Fig. 1). Unlike the SERJ algorithm
proposed in this paper, the secrecy outage probability
of SMER is non-zero. In the next section, we will see
how this non-zero eavesdropping probability affects the
power consumption of secret communication.
Before we proceed to the numerical results, we com-
pare the asymptotic complexity of SERJ and SMER
algorithms in a network that consists of n system nodes.
Running Time. In order to find the optimal path using
SERJ we should simply assign the weights described in
Section III-D to the links between the legitimate nodes
of the network, and then we need to apply the Dijkstra’s
algorithm once, which is a polynomial algorithm with
running time O(n2). Hence, the asymptotic running time
of SERJ is polynomial in n which makes us classify
SERJ as an efficient routing algorithm. On the other
hand, SMER is a pseudo-polynomial algorithm of order
O(n2B), where B is the maximum cost of any path
in the network. Note that, while the running time of
SMER is polynomial in B, the actual value of B grows
exponentially with the size of the input (i.e., the number
of bits used to represent link costs). That is, if l bits
are used to represent the link cost values then B will
be of order 2l. Therefore, in practice, SERJ will be
much faster than SMER, especially in situations that the
cost of communication is high and thus the value of B
is large (e.g. large networks, large path-loss exponents,
high uncertainty in the locations of the eavesdroppers,
...).
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Fig. 1: Three sectors have an eavesdropper with probabil-
ity one, and the rest of the sectors have an eavesdropper
with probability zero.
To get more insight into the problem, first we consider
secure one-hop transmission from a transmitter S to a
receiver D in the presence of eavesdroppers. Next, we
will consider multi-hop minimum energy routing in a
network and in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers.
In both cases, we assume that the system nodes and the
eavesdroppers use 14-bit A/Ds, and we set θ = 10−6. We
set the source-destination outage probability π = 0.1,
receiver noise power N0 = 1 (eavesdropper noise power
is zero in both SERJ and SMER), γ∗D = 42 and γ
∗
E = 34,
which results in the secrecy rate Rs = 0.3 (bits/use).
We consider different propagation attenuation scenarios:
α = 2 which is the path-loss exponent corresponding to
free space, and α = 3 and α = 4 which are the path-loss
exponents corresponding to a terrestrial environment.
A. One-Hop Communication
Consider a single hop in a wireless network, consisting
of a transmitter S and a receiver D (Fig. 2). For SMER,
suppose two jammers J1 and J2 help the transmitter to
convey its message to the receiver securely [32]. The
distance between each jammer and the source is denoted
by d. In the remainder of this section, we consider the
effect of various parameters of the network on the energy
consumption of our scheme and SMER.
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Fig. 2: One-hop communication between source S and
destination D in the presence of eavesdroppers (Es). In
SMER, two jammers J1 and J2 help to make the link
secure.
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Fig. 3: Power consumption of SERJ and SMER versus
the number of eavesdroppers for various values of path-
loss exponent α.
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Fig. 4: Power consumption of SERJ and SMER versus
the radious rmin of the guard region for various values
of α and when only one eavesdropper is present. As
we allow the eavesdropper to become closer to the
transmitter (i.e. as rmin gets smaller), the power needed
to make the link secure using SMER becomes higher. On
the other hand, with SERJ there is no need to assume a
guard region around the transmitter.
Number of Eavesdroppers. Fig. 3 shows the trans-
mission power versus the number of eavesdroppers
around the transmitter2. In this figure, peav = 10
−5,
rmin = 0.01, rmax = 2, and dSD = 1. As shown in
Section III, the power required when employing SERJ
does not depend on the number of eavesdroppers. On the
other hand, when the number of eavesdroppers increases,
the power needed to establish a secure link using SMER
increases dramatically. Since the cost of communication
using SERJ only depends on the distance between the
transmitter and the receiver which is normalized to
dSD = 1, the cost of using SERJ does not change with
the change of path-loss exponent in these plots.
Guard Region Radius. Whereas the proposed algo-
rithm (SERJ) does not require a guard region, recall that
SMER cannot be utilized without such. Fig. 4 shows the
power versus rmin in the presence of nE = 5 eavesdrop-
pers, and for various values of the path-loss exponent α.
We set dSD = 1, peav = 10
−5 and rmax = 2. We observe
that when rmin gets small, the power needed to establish
a secure link using SMER increases dramatically, while
the power needed to establish a secure link using SERJ
does not depend on the location of the eavesdropper. In
fact as is shown in Section III, the power used by SERJ
is independent of the distance between the transmitter
and the eavesdroppers, and, even if the eavesdroppers
2In all figures in this section, P denotes the aggregate power
consumed by the algorithm.
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Fig. 5: Power consumption of SERJ and SMER versus
rmax for various values of α and when nE = 5
eavesdroppers are present. The performance of SMER
is closely dependent on the uncertainity in the locations
of the eavesdroppers, while the performance of SERJ
does not depend on the locations of the eavedroppers.
get very close to the transmitter, they cannot intercept
the message.
Uncertainty in the Location of Eavesdroppers.
In Fig. 5, the power needed to transmit the message
securely versus rmax for various values of the path-loss
exponent α is depicted. For SMER we set peav = 10
−5
and rmin = 0.01. As rmax increases, the uncertainty
in the location of the eavesdroppers increases, and thus
in SMER the jammers need to consume more power to
cover a larger area. On the other hand, with SERJ, the
transmit power is independent of the locations of the
eavesdroppers.
Eavesdropping Probability. As was shown in Section
III, the eavesdropping probability of SERJ is zero. But,
the eavesdropping probability of SMER is not zero.
Fig. 6 shows the power needed to establish a secure
link versus the eavesdropping probability when nE = 5
eavesdroppers are present, rmin = .01, and rmax = 2. It
can be seen that the power consumption of SMER dra-
matically changes when the secrecy outage probability
changes. In particular, for small secrecy outage probabil-
ities, the power consumption of SMER is substantially
higher than the power consumption of SERJ.
Distance between Source and Destination. Fig. 7
shows the transmission power versus the distance be-
tween source and destination dSD for various values of
α. For SMER, we set peav = 10
−5, rmin = .01, and
rmax = 2dSD. As the distance between the transmitter
and the receiver gets longer, the transmit power of both
schemes increases.
0 ... 1e−10 1e−9 1e−8 1e−7 1e−6 1e−5 1e−4 1e−3 1e−2 1e−1
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Eavesdropping probability
lo
g(P
)
 
 
SMER, α=4
SMER, α=3
SMER, α=2
SERJ
Fig. 6: Power consumption of SERJ and SMER versus
eavesdropping probability for various values of α and
when nE = 5 eavesdroppers are present. For small
secrecy outage probabilities, the power consumption of
SMER is substantially higher than the power consump-
tion of SERJ.
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Fig. 7: Power consumption of SERJ and SMER versus
the distance between source and destination dSD for
various values of α and when nE = 5 eavesdroppers are
present. As the distance between the transmitter and the
receiver gets longer, the transmit power of both schemes
increases.
Quality of Eavesdroppers’ A/Ds. Fig. 8 shows the
transmission power versus the resolution of eavesdrop-
pers’ A/Ds bE for various values of α. The distance
between the transmitter and the receiver dSD = 1,
and for SMER, we set peav = 10
−5, rmin = .01,
and rmax = 2. While with SMER the performance
is independent of the quality of eavesdroppers’ A/Ds,
with SERJ as the resolution of eavesdroppers’ A/Ds gets
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Fig. 8: Power consumption of SERJ and SMER versus
the resolution of eavesdroppers’ A/Ds bE for various
values of α and when nE = 5 eavesdroppers are
present. As bE become higher, with SERJ we need
more jamming power and thus the power consumption
of SERJ increases while with SMER, the performance
is independent of the quality of eavesdroppers’ A/Ds.
higher the transmit power increases because it needs
more jamming power to provide secrecy.
B. Multi-Hop Communication
We consider a wireless network that consists of n sys-
tem nodes and nE eavesdroppers which are distributed
uniformly at random on a 5×5 square. Our goal is to find
a secure path with minimum aggregate energy from the
source to the destination, using SERJ and SMER. For the
remainder of this section, we assume that in SMER, for
every node, two friendly jammers exist that help the node
to establish a secure link. We average the results over 10
random realizations of the network. In each realization,
the system nodes are distributed uniformly at random,
and the closest system node to the point (0, 0) is the
source of the message and the closest system node to
the point (5, 5) is the destination. We consider the path-
loss exponent α = 3, since α = 2 corresponds to non-
terrestrial environments, and α = 4 leads to very high
link costs of SMER, which makes the running time of
SMER excessively high. In the sequel, we investigate
the effect of various parameters on the total energy
consumption of SERJ and SMER, and compare their
performances.
Number of Eavesdroppers. The average power P
versus the number of eavesdroppers for SERJ and SMER
is shown in Fig. 9. There are n = 25 system nodes in
addition to the eavesdroppers. The path-loss exponent of
the environment is α = 3. For SMER, we set peav =
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Fig. 9: Power consumption of SERJ and SMER versus
the number of eavesdroppers. As the number of eaves-
droppers increases, the amount of power that SMER
uses increases, while the amount of power that SERJ
uses does not depend on the number and location of the
eavesdroppers.
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Fig. 10: Power consumption of SERJ and SMER versus
the number of system nodes. For both algorithms the
average power is not sensitive to the number of system
nodes.
10−5, rmin = .03, and rmax = 2. It can be seen that for
very small numbers of eavesdroppers, the performance
of SMER is better than that of SERJ. However, as the
number of eavesdroppers increases, the amount of power
that SMER uses increases and becomes more than the
power that SERJ consumes. As is shown in Section III,
the amount of power that SERJ uses does not depend on
the number and location of the eavesdroppers.
Number of System Nodes. The effect of the number
of system nodes on the average aggregate power con-
sumption is shown in Fig. 10. There are nE = 25 eaves-
droppers, and the path-loss exponent of the environment
is α = 3. For SMER, we set peav = 10
−5, rmin = .03,
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Fig. 11: Power consumption of SERJ and SMER versus
the uncertainity in the location of the eavesdropper
(i.e. rmax around each transmitter in the network). The
transmit power using SERJ is independent of the location
of the eavesdroppers. But with SMER, as the uncertainty
in the location of the eavesdroppers increases the power
consumption increases.
and rmax = 2.
It can be seen that the performance of SERJ is always
superior to the performance of SMER. For both algo-
rithms the average power is not sensitive to the number
of system nodes. The fluctuations in this figure are due
to the random generation of network configurations.
Uncertainty in the Location of the Eavesdroppers.
In Fig. 11, the power needed to transmit the message
securely versus rmax is shown. There are n = 25
system nodes and nE = 25 eavesdroppers, and the
path-loss exponent of the environment is α = 3. For
SMER, we set peav = 10
−5 and rmin = 0.03. With
SERJ, the transmit power is independent of the location
of the eavesdroppers. With SMER, as rmax increases,
the uncertainty in the location of the eavesdroppers
increases, and thus the jammers need to consume more
power to cover a larger area. For the case that SMER
is secure against any eavesdropper in the network (i.e.
rmax = 5, if we do not consider the guard regions
around the transmitters), the power spent by SMER is
substantially higher than the power spent by SERJ.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have considered secure energy-
efficient routing in a quasi-static multi-path fading envi-
ronment in the presence of passive eavesdroppers. Since
the eavesdroppers are passive, their locations and CSIs
are not known to the legitimate nodes. Thus we looked
for approaches that do not rely on the locations and qual-
ity of the channels of the eavesdroppers. We developed
an energy-efficient routing algorithm based on random
jamming to exploit non-idealities of the eavesdropper’s
receiver to provide secrecy. Our routing algorithm is fast
(finds the optimal path in polynomial time), and does
not depend on the number of eavesdroppers and their
location and/or channel state information.
We have performed several simulations over single-
hop and multi-hop networks with various network pa-
rameters, and compared the performance of our proposed
algorithm with that of the SMER algorithm of [32],
[33]. A major weakness of SMER is that it requires
the definition of a guard region that restricts how close
eavesdroppers can come to system nodes. Even with
such a guard region, which SERJ does not require, we
observed that when the uncertainty in the location of
the eavesdroppers is high and in disadvantaged wireless
environments, the energy consumption of our algorithm
is substantially less than that of the SMER algorithm.
Gains of SERJ over SMER would be even more sub-
stantial in environments with "smart" eavesdroppers; for
example, eavesdroppers that located themselves close to
system nodes or pointed directional antennas at system
nodes would significantly degrade the performance of
SMER, but there would be no impact on the performance
of SERJ. Hence, the proposed algorithm directly ad-
dresses one of the key roadblocks to the implementation
of information-theoretic security in wireless networks:
robustness to the operating environment.
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